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9.1  Introduction 
In this paper,  I argue first that, contrary  to perceptions outside of  Japan, 
Japanese industrial policy per se does not play a critical role either in strate- 
gically  restructuring  the  Japanese  economy  or  in  forming  government- 
industry cartels to promote Japanese exports. If contemporary industrial pol- 
icy  is important, it is because  of  its role  in coordinating  the planning  and 
managerial decisions of individual firms and in helping in the dissemination 
of information. 
In the first half of this paper, I try to support this view by providing a brief 
historical account of Japanese industrial policy. To  be more precise,  I argue 
that postwar Japanese industrial policy was transformed toward the end of the 
1960s. Until then, its major aim was to promote several key industries in order 
to take advantage of the benefits of  international trade. Policies tended to in- 
volve direct regulation requiring government involvement,  such as licensing 
and granting the authority to allocate foreign exchange. 
Since then, the trend has changed, and the main focus of policy seems to be 
correcting market failures,  including promoting  private  research and devel- 
opment (R&D) efforts and assisting in the structural adjustment of the econ- 
omy. Policies also have become soji measures, such as assisting in the reloca- 
tion of workers (or factories) from depressed areas (or industries) to growing 
ones, and promoting research associations to help private firms engage in co- 
operative R&D efforts. 
Nonetheless,  access to the Japanese market seems to be heavily restricted. 
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There is  also an  export downpour: that is, Japanese firms pour down their 
exports to foreign markets over very short periods, harming the domestic pro- 
ducers. This paper argues that these problems originate not from the strategic 
nature of  industrial policy but from the way  policy decisions generally are 
made and put into practice in Japan. In this sense, the problem is far broader 
than industrial policy per se. 
To put it succinctly, policy decisions in Japan reflect the interests of insiders 
(usually only producers-consumers  are excluded). Moreover, decisions are 
not made on some abstract philosophical basis, nor are they  made according 
to clearly spelled-out rules.  Instead, they are made on a practical basis by 
negotiation among insiders; the policies that are most easily implemented, and 
that cause the least political conflict, tend to be adopted. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 9.2 defines the concept of indus- 
trial policy and briefly surveys recent theoretical contribution on industrial 
policy. In  section 9.3, a very brief historical account of  Japanese industrial 
policy is presented. Sections 9.4 and 9.5 describe major contemporary indus- 
trial policies in Japan: R&D assistance and dealings with trade conflicts. In 
section 9.6, the system of Japanese policy-making from the viewpoint of po- 
litical economy theory is summarized. Section 9.7 briefly discusses the Large 
Stores Law to support our view on how Japanese policies are practiced. Sec- 
tion 9.8 concludes the paper. 
9.2  Industrial Policy: Its Scope and Limits 
In economics, industrial policy is a relatively new concept that lacks a well- 
accepted definition. In  this paper, I use the following definition: Industrial 
policy is any “policy that attempts to achieve the economic and noneconomic 
goals of  a country by  intervening in resource allocation across industries or 
sectors, or in the (industrial) organization of an industry or sector” (Itoh et al. 
199  1).  This definition emphasizes microeconomic aspects of  the economy 
and focuses on inter- and/or intraindustry resource allocation. An alternative 
definition, often assumed to be implicit in Japan, is that of Kaizuka (1973, p. 
163): “With little sarcasm, I would define industrial policy to be the policy 
that MITI implements.” I shall follow this definition when  I give historical 
accounts of Japanese industrial policy. 
For the purpose of this paper, it is useful to classify industrial policies into 
two basic subcategories: strategic policies and  corrective policies. Strategic 
policies promote certain industries (sectors) for the benefit of  domestic wel- 
fare; corrective policies improve economic efficiency by  correcting market 
failures. However, these two types of policies are not mutually exclusive. 
1. For other related definitions, see Komiya, Okuno,  and Suzumura (1988) and Suzumura and 
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9.2.1  Strategic Policies 
Recent theoretical contributions have identified two cases where strategic 
policies may be effective: where there are externalities and where monopoly 
rents may be shifted. 
First, some form of externality may create economies of scale on a national 
level and nonconvexity in the economy. The traditional infant industry argu- 
ment, which emphasizes external dynamic economies, is an example of  this 
approach.* Alternatively, if Marshallian externality exists so that, as an indus- 
try’s total output increases, the industry’s average cost declines and its produc- 
tivity improves, there may be multiple equilibria: one where the industry pro- 
duces no output because average cost is too high compared with the demand 
price,  and the other where positive production takes place using (industry- 
level) economies of scale. Moreover, these equilibria often are Pareto ranked. 
Hence, if an economy is trapped in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium, policy inter- 
vention  to  reallocate  interindustry  resources  may  shift the  economy to  a 
Pareto-superior equilibrium (see, e.g., Okuno-Fujiwara 1988). 
Questions still remain as to how Marshallian externality (or national-level 
economies  of  scale)  evolves.  Ethier  (1982)  and  Okuno-Fujiwara  (1988) 
showed that Marshallian externality indeed may occur if several industries are 
interrelated and if monopolistic or oligopolistic competition prevails in a crit- 
ical part of  this nexus, for example with parts suppliers for an industry that 
has the potential to draw a large portion of laborers. The latter, further identi- 
fied coordination failure among monopolistic firms may be the cause of this 
phenomenon.  In  other words,  if  these firms’ expectations about the future 
course of the economy change (from one rational expectation to another ra- 
tional expectation),  a Pareto-superior equilibrium may  be  achieved. Thus, 
policies to coordinate firms’ incentive or to change future expectations of eco- 
nomic agents may be effective in moving the economy away from the Pareto- 
inferior eq~ilibrium.~ 
If one believes in this explanation, one of its inescapable conclusions is that 
the industrial structure of  an economy may not be determined by  tastes and 
resource endowments alone, as is the case with the Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
Instead,  industrial structure may be determined by  historical accidents and 
policy interventions. This implies that free trade may not be the best system, 
as an economy or the world may be trapped in an inferior equilibrium. Some 
sort of coordinated policy intervention or managed trade may be desirable. 
This type of  strategic policy may be justified because it could improve the 
2. For details of  the infant industry protection argument, see Itoh et al. (1989). chap. 4; and 
3. For the explicit treatment of expectation in a dynamic model with multiple rational expecta- 
4. For the detail of this argument, see Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) and Itoh et al. (1989), chaps. 
Corden ( 1974). 
tion equilibrium paths, see Matsuyama (1989). 
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welfare of the country, and even of the world, by  substantially reducing the 
price of the industry’s product. Moreover, the benefit of such a policy may be 
relatively large if the nexus of industries that become competitive draws a big 
share of resources. 
Critics of this approach emphasize that this type of  strategic policy is justi- 
fied on the grounds of externality. Externalities being difficult to identify and 
measure in practice, they argue that application of this approach is severely 
limited. 
A second line of  explanation for strategic policies relies on the strategic 
behaviors  in international  oligopolistic rivalry.  Originated by  Brander and 
Spencer (1981, 1983), it suggests that providing a subsidy to domestic firms 
may benefit the country if these firms face oligopolistic competition with for- 
eign rivals.  The underlying logic is that the subsidy makes domestic firms’ 
behavior more aggressive and, more important, that this change in the firms’ 
attitude  becomes  credible  to their  rivals  because  the  subsidy  changes  the 
firms’ own incentives. The resulting expansion in the firms’ production occurs 
at the cost of foreign rivals, shifting monopoly rent from foreign firms to do- 
mestic firms. It also affects the consumer surplus in the market in which rivals 
compete, as more aggressive behavior may cause the price of the product to 
fall. 
Although this explanation drew more attention than the first approach, there 
are limitations to the argument. First and most seriously, as far as rent shifting 
between  foreign  and  domestic  firms,  this  policy  is  of  the  “Beggar-thy- 
Neighbor” type: the country obtains benefits at the cost of foreign countries. 
This policy is likely to draw retaliation from other countries, and the chain of 
retaliations might destroy world trade.  Second, its main argument relies on 
rent shifting in one industry, which may be too small to justify policy interven- 
tion. Moreover, the argument depends upon the existence of  entry barriers, 
for otherwise monopoly rent would di~sipate.~ 
To sum up, strategic policies should not be denounced outright. Some may 
benefit not only the home country but also the foreign countries. On the other 
hand,  certain  strategic policies benefit the home country at the cost of  the 
foreign countries.  The difference is that, in the former, the policies help to 
reduce the social production cost (that is, the sum of production costs incurred 
by private firms and the cost of government support) while, in the latter, poli- 
cies help to reduce private cost without changing the social production cost. 
9.2.2  Corrective Policies 
Two branches of corrective policies are relevant in  the following discus- 
sions: policies to promote private R&D and policies to assist structural adjust- 
ments.  R&D is one of  the prime examples of economic activities that  are 
5. For more extensive review of  this theory, see, e.g.,  Brander (1986) and  Grossrnan (1986) 275  Industrial Policy in Japan 
prone to market failures. Fruits of R&D cannot be appropriated to investors, 
and they spill over easily to other firms, so it is often claimed that there is a 
socially insufficient incentive for R&D without government support. To cor- 
rect this,  subsidizing private R&D and providing incentives in other forms 
have become popular in developed countries. 
Theoretically speaking, however, other aspects of R&D may make private 
efforts socially excessive. If the results of R&D can be patented, for example, 
then pursuing economic rents accruable to resulting innovations may induce 
socially excessive competition.6 Even if  there is uncertainty in the outcome, 
R&D creates negative externalities, as it may reduce the probability that other 
firms can secure the same outcome. As the externalities affect an industry’s 
firms indiscriminately, R&D again may become socially excessive (see Loury 
1979; Lee and Wilde 1980). Whether public support is justified or not, there- 
fore, should depend upon the relative magnitude of these two effects and can 
only be determined empirically. Nonetheless, policymakers in many countries 
seem to take it as a foregone conclusion that government support is required 
in this area, and Japan is no exception.’ 
Another policy-which  may be classified as corrective-that  has been uti- 
lized extensively in Japan is that of  assisting industries that are harmed  by 
changes in external environments, such as a rise in oil price or an unexpected 
change in exchange rates.  These  are called  structural adjustment policies. 
When a change in external environments occurs and a country’s comparative 
advantage changes, resources must move from one (declining) industry to an- 
other (growing) industry. Many resources are industry specific, however, and 
cannot move within  a short period.  If  there is an additional market failure, 
such as wage rigidity, resources trapped  in declining industries may  suffer 
from unemployment, and inefficient resource allocation will result. Policy as- 
sistance is called for.8 
The first-best policy for structural adjustment is eliminating the market fail- 
ure that causes unemployment (e.g., wage rigidity in the earlier example). If 
the first-best policy is not available, several possibilities ~emain.~  As declining 
industry  suffers  from deteriorated  export opportunities,  or  from  increased 
competition from foreign imports, trade restriction provides relief. However, 
protection provides incentives for resources to stay within the declining indus- 
try, which is the opposite of  what structural adjustment intends. To  provide 
the correct incentives and to assist adjustment, it is critical that trade restric- 
6. For the detail of  this argument, see Barzel(l968). 
7. For survey of theories of R&D incentives see, e.g.,  Itoh et al. (1989), Scherer (1980), Tirole 
(1989) and Kamien and Schwartz (1982). 
8. Existence of industry-specific resources makes resource owners in the  declining industries 
suffer from lower return, but this alone does not justify policy interventions. For, as long as there 
are no market failures, this is the unavoidable cost to the economy. See, e.g.,  Mussa (1982). 
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tion (and other help for declining industries) is provided only temporarily. The 
time limit must be made explicit and credible. 
If  unemployment results because of external shocks, another possibility is 
to provide wage subsidies. Although this, like trade restriction, is effective for 
improving employment,  it shields consumers from the changes in  relative 
prices (terms of  trade) that are caused by  external shocks and, hence, is in- 
ferior to trade restriction. 
Cartelization is another often-used policy measure. Declining industry is 
encouraged to form a cartel to limit the level of production or the extent of 
capacity utilization.  By  this,  domestic price may be kept high and damage 
may be eliminated.  However, allowing cartelization may enhance collusive 
behavior, which harms consumers’ welfare. Forcing the exporting country to 
form a (voluntary) export cartel and to restrict the amount of exports works 
the same as obstructing competition. 
Helping growing industries to absorb new equipment is called positive ad- 
justment policy (PAP). The policies listed above to help declining industries 
maintain their employment are called negative adjustment policy (NAP). PAP 
is often thought to be superior to NAP.  However, the issue is subtle. Even 
without PAP,  economic incentives exist to direct resources from declining to 
growing  industries.  But  is  facilitating  this  resource  movement  beneficial 
to the country? If  there is no additional market failure, it may be best not to 
intervene in the market mechanism, as was shown by  Mussa (1982). More- 
over, as Neary (1982) and others have shown, it might be better to slow the 
movement of  resources. For example, suppose wages are rigid and capital is 
industry specific in the short run. If the declining industry is relatively more 
labor intensive than the growing industry, then accelerating the movement of 
labor from the former to the latter may increase unemployment, as the grow- 
ing industry cannot absorb enough workers in the short run. 
9.3  A Brief History of Industrial Policy in Japan 
Though some time has passed since foreign interests in Japanese industrial 
policy evolved,  some myths about the policy still seem to exist. There are 
strong opinions abroad that the policy is one of the main elements of the “Ja- 
pan, Inc”; that is, a nexus of  private corporations and the Japanese govern- 
ment that effectively controls the Japanese economy through conspiratorial 
cartels and regulations. Some also believe that the policy is designed to pro- 
tect domestic industries from foreign competition through the use of overt and 
covert measures. In this section, I try to argue that these beliefs are not well 
founded from a historical viewpoint. 
Chronologically, industrial policy in  postwar Japan may  be  divided into 
three different time periods: 1945-60,  1960-73,  and  1973 to the present. In 
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9.3.1  1945-60'" 
This is the period when Japan tried to reconstruct its economy after devas- 
tating defeat. The 1946 production index was one-fifth of  the prewar peak, 
and one-quarter of the national wealth had been lost during the war.  In addi- 
tion, international trade was severely restricted by the allied force. In order to 
sustain its economy and provide food for a large population, which included 
7.6 million discharged soldiers, the government continued wartime regulation 
and control. This is typified by the so-called Priority Production System (PPS) 
of  1946-48.  Designed by  a Marxist economist, H. Arisawa, the PPS was 
intended to start reconstruction by concentrating domestic resources into two 
critical industries: steel and coal. The only available natural resource at the 
time was coal. But there was a bottleneck in increasing coal production: a lack 
of  steel. With the PPS, the entire coal production effort was thrown into the 
steel industry. The entire steel production was then cast in coal production. 
By  repeating this process,  it was hoped that both steel and coal production 
would increase and would eventually make other industries revive. To  help 
PPS, materials, workers, and funds were ordered to be concentrated in these 
two industries. 
Direct governmental regulation of the economy typified by the PPS contin- 
ued until late 1950s, but there was less emphasis on direct control toward the 
end. There were three factors that made government take this position. First, 
although the Korean War boom boosted reconstruction, the Japanese economy 
did not recover from defeat until mid-1950s. Some form of government inter- 
vention was necessary, for international trade was still restricted, and large 
disguised unemployment existed in agricultural sector. 
Second, the government had many levers with which to adopt direct regu- 
latory measures. The Temporary Commodities Demand and Supply Adjust- 
ment Law of  1946 gave the government extensive power to intervene in pri- 
vate economic activities.  Under this  law,  the government could ration any 
commodity (for consumption and production), or prohibit or restrict usage of 
and production or shipment of  any commodity whose supply was limited. 
This law lost its effect in  1952, but many powers with which to regulate the 
private  sector remained  with  the government until  the  late  1950s or early 
1960s. Access to foreign exchange was essential for firms that need foreign 
resources to construct new plants and to obtain technology licenses from tech- 
nologically advanced foreign firms. But foreign exchange and foreign capital 
were controlled and rationed. The Enterprise Rationalization Promotion Law 
of  1952 provided special depreciation allowances and tariff exemption to key 
industries. 
Third, after the zaibatsu (the family-held groups of  companies that domi- 
10. For more details, see Kosai (1986, 1988). 278  Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara 
nated the prewar economy) were dissolved by  the occupation force, the gov- 
ernment’s influence increased. Heavily influenced by  the experience of  war- 
time control, bureaucrats of this period seemed to have  come to believe in 
governmental control and direct regulation of the economy. 
To  sum, industrial policy in  this period aimed at directly regulating and 
controlling economic activities of the private sector. The philosophy behind 
such a policy stance reflected the training that bureaucrats received in the war- 
time, controlled economy. Toward the end of  this period, the Japanese econ- 
omy started to take off. Some believe that industrial policy was responsible 
for the relatively quick reconstruction and take-off. However, strong entrepre- 
neurial spirits existed in the private sector, despite the bureaucratic attempts 
to contain them. Many economists believe these spirits were the major factor 
of the Japanese economy’s performance in this period (see Kosai 1986, 1988). 
9.3.2  1960-73” 
This is the famous “rapid growth’ period of the Japanese economy. It is also 
considered the heyday of Japanese industrial policy. Between 1960 and 1970, 
Japan enjoyed an average growth rate of  11.6% in real terms. Industrial struc- 
ture transformed dramatically from agriculture to  manufacturing and  from 
light industries (such as textiles) to heavy industries (such as steel, petrochem- 
icals, and automobiles). This transformation was accelerated by the explosion 
of exports in heavy industry products. 
In  1960, the government announced the Plan for Trade and Foreign Ex- 
change Liberalization. Until then, many imports were restricted by the system 
of licenses and foreign exchange quotas. With the liberalization, however, the 
ratio of imports with the automatic approval system increased from 49% in 
1960 to 92% in  1963 and eventually to 97% in  1967. In 1964, Japan became 
an Article 8 country of the IMF and obtained membership in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Despite these developments, industrial policy in this period was character- 
ized by an emphasis on strategic policies. The Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) tried to promote several key industries by trade protec- 
tion, tax advantages, and subsidies in various forms. Industries were selected, 
at least officially, according to three main criteria: productivity growth, in- 
come elasticity, and employment relatedness. Industries that appeared to (1) 
promise high productivity growth, (2) be characterized by large income elas- 
ticity of  demand so that an increase in demand could be expected with the 
growth of the world economy, and (3) have  many related industries whose 
growth would promote employment were assisted with various policy mea- 
sures. 
MITI bureaucrats also attempted to control the level of private capacity in- 
vestment. They believed that, in industries characterized by scale economies, 
11. For more details, see Kosai (1986) and Tsuruta (1988a). 279  Industrial Policy in Japan 
competition would create excessively many small firms with excessively large 
total capacity within the industry. The resulting “excessive competition” was 
believed, in turn, to jeopardize Japanese competitiveness in the world. In or- 
der to secure “orderly” competition, each firm was advised to specialize in 
production of certain goods so that they would not compete with each other. 
Public assistance was provided to renovate production facilities in  order to 
take advantage of scale economies. Mergers were also encouraged to reduce 
excessive competition. 
Partly in order to facilitate these measures and partly in order to meet the 
effects of trade and foreign capital liberalizations, MITI proposed the Law on 
Extraordinary Measures for the Promotion of Specified Manufacturing Indus- 
tries in  1962. This law was to integrate and strengthen existing laws so that 
MITI would  have  wide-ranging effective power  to  apply direct regulatory 
measures. Moreover, the law proposed a new government-business relation- 
ship, called kun-min kyocho hoshiki. Based on public committees consisting 
of bureaucrats, business leaders, and academic experts, the proposed new re- 
lationship was expected to rechannel the principal determinant of  resource 
allocation away from the market mechanism and into the artificial coordina- 
tion of government and business sector. However, it met with strong opposi- 
tion from the private sector, notably from the financial sector, and it was never 
enacted. This typified the new trend that, though government tried to keep its 
hand in managing the economy as in the previous period, the private sector 
started to resist public intervention in favor of free market mechanism. 
Moreover,  although many  industries such as automobiles, electric appli- 
ances, and steel have succeeded in dramatically increasing their exports, this 
success should not be ascribed solely to government assistance. With trade 
and foreign capital liberalization, the government lost much of the leverage it 
needed in order to intervene in the private sector. Perhaps the most effective 
step in promoting exports in this period was the government’s announcement 
of  the liberalization schedule of  various products. With this announcement 
each industry, knowing that foreign competitors would soon start their busi- 
ness in its domestic market, endeavored to improve its productivity, or the 
quality of its products, and renovate its facilities. Moreover, the government 
delayed trade liberalization of certain key industries as long as foreign pres- 
sures allowed, a move which provided sufficient time for these industries to 
take necessary actions. Many industries were thus ready for competition with 
foreign rivals not only in the domestic market but also in markets abroad by 
the time the actual liberalization took place.  l2 
To sum up, this period may be characterized by the use of strategic policies. 
The mechanism behind strategic policy in this period seems to be close to the 
externality-based explanation of the previous section. It is doubtful, however, 
that  in  designing their  policy MITI bureaucrats were conscious of  such a 
12. For theoretical analysis behind these facts, see Matsuyama and Itoh (1985). 280  Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara 
mechanism. Their criteria for industry selection may have been simply cos- 
metic.13  In fact, Komiya (1988) suggests, “I believe that the government pro- 
moted  exactly those industries that  most Japanese felt the  country had  to 
have .” 
This period was also characterized by  the strain between the government 
and the private sector. The government attempted to intervene in the market 
mechanism by applying direct regulation, but private corporations resisted all 
such attempts. The attempt to restructure the Japanese automobile industry in 
this period is another well-known example of this strain. In  1961, MITI an- 
nounced a plan to reduce the number of automobile producers to, at most 
three, one each for mass-production  of cars, specialty cars, and minicars. This 
proposal again met strong opposition and ten Japanese automobile manufac- 
turers still remain today, nine of which produce mass-production cars. 
Toward the end of this period, MITI officials reluctantly gave up the idea of 
direct regulation and shifted their policy emphasis from “hard” measures to 
“soft” measures. Namely, their main policy goals changed to helping coordi- 
nation among private firms, suggesting desirable directions for the Japanese 
economy, and providing public assistance and/or incentives so that private 
firms will follow the suggested course. Prime examples of this kind include 
the announcement of various MITI “visions” and “plans,” which suggest a 
consistent and desirable course that the Japanese economy might take in the 
next five or ten years. These visions and plans were drafted in governmental 
committees by members from various sectors of the economy. Some observers 
believe that these plans may have worked as a coordination device as well as 
functioning as a means of informational exchange among private firms (see 
Komiya 1975; Okuno-Fujiwara 1988). 
9.3.3  1971 to the Present 
This is the period when Japanese economy repeatedly suffered from exter- 
nal as well as internal drastic structural changes. In  1971, President Nixon 
announced the suspension of  the dollar’s convertibility to gold and the impo- 
sition of  an import surcharge. With this announcement, the fixed exchange 
system of the postwar period ended. Between 1973 and 1974, the price of oil 
quadrupled by OPEC’s initiative. With the mismanagement of domestic mon- 
etary policy, the inflation rate jumped to 30%, and the rate of  the nominal 
wage increase to 50%. In 1974, the unemployment rate doubled and the coun- 
try’s real growth rate recorded the first negative number in the postwar era. 
Because of yen appreciation and increases in the price of oil, many (heavy) 
industries, which are very dependent on imported oil and export possibilities, 
started to have structural problems. 
Shortly after the recovery from the first oil shock, there was steep yen ap- 
13. In fact, MITI tried to promote  almost all major industries,  such as shipbuilding,  steel, 
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preciation between 1977-78;  the second oil shock hit the Japanese economy 
in  1979-80.  The problems of  troubled industries got aggravated and  their 
needs for further public help were voiced loudly.  With the level of accumu- 
lated  public  debts  quickly  becoming  unbearably  high,  however,  macro- 
oriented fiscal assistance was abandoned and microbased industrial adjust- 
ment policies were employed. After the recovery from this crisis, the yen 
remained relatively cheap until the Plaza agreement of  1985. The agreement, 
however, induced another sharp rise in  the yen, but its effect was relatively 
mild, contrary to the expectation of many Japanese. 
In spite of these developments, Japanese trade as well as current accounts 
have recorded increasingly large surpluses, except for the two oil shock sub- 
periods. Strong foreign criticisms were cast, first on the chronic trade surplus, 
then on the Japanese government’s policy attitudes, and finally on the behav- 
ior of Japanese firms and the Japanese people in general. Meeting with these 
“trade conflicts” as well as “economic conflicts” became one of the most im- 
portant objectives of industrial policy in this period. In section 9.5, I shall 
come back to a more detailed account of these conflicts. 
Another trend of industrial policy existed in this period: decreasing empha- 
sis on  strategic policies. Partly because the Japanese economy had  already 
grown sufficiently and few industries needed assistance for promotion, and 
partly because foreign criticisms against industrial targeting became too fer- 
vent to be ignored, the MITI tried to shift its policy emphasis from strategic 
policies to corrective policies. The MITI’s position in  international trade has 
gradually changed to support free trade. With continuous reduction of  tariff 
rates, Japan became one of the countries whose overall tariff rate is lowest in 
the world (see Komiya and Itoh 1988). With visible trade barriers removed, 
the MITI’s stance became, at least publicly, that of  a protector and promoter 
of the free trade system in the world. 
To  sum up, there were three main objectives of  industrial policy in  this 
period: providing adjustment assistance to troubled industries suffering from 
the aforementioned structural changes, meeting with foreign criticisms and 
demands concerning Japan and trading problems, and encouraging R&D in 
the private sector. Assistance for R&D may  be viewed to reflect the shift of 
the MITI’s emphasis on corrective policies. Among policies that are of a cor- 
rective nature, however, R&D assistance seems to be most fitted to MITI, as 
it may work as strategic policy as well. Although the amount is negligible in 
nominal terms,  various forms of  policies to  assist private R&D were  at- 
tempted in this period. I shall discuss these policies somewhat extensively in 
the next section. 
Adjustment assistance for domestic industries took several forms: assisting 
workers to relocate and to train themselves for new jobs, providing assistance 
for depressed areas, and so on. However, the major policy tools were the fol- 
lowing two: the establishment of joint credit funds to purchase scrapped facil- 
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excessive facilities), and allowing a capacity-reduction cartel in  designated 
industries. According to Sekiguchi and Horiuchi (1988) the first tool was ap- 
parently not too attractive for firms, as firms did not have much use for the 
guarantees. They are also doubtful about the effectiveness of allowing cartel 
formation, as there is no significant difference in the level of capacity reduc- 
tion between designated and undesignated industries. Nonetheless, one can- 
not deny the possibility of undesignated industries tacitly colluding to form 
cartels. As Lawrence (1  989) points out, Japanese adjustment assistance poli- 
cies in general were not very transparent. 
9.4  Industrial Policy for Private R&D 
One of  the focuses of Japanese industrial policy in the 1980s has been to 
assist private R&D efforts. Japanese R&D expenditure has been dominated by 
the private sector. For example, in 1987, more than 9 trillion yen (2.57% of 
GNP) was spent on R&D activities, of which only 19.9% was funded by  the 
government. This ratio is substantially low when compared with other major 
developed countries (see table 9.1). Moreover, this  ratio  of  government- 
funded R&D to total R&D expenditure has been steadily declining (except for 
the last few years).  One might note, however, that this low  ratio partially 
stems from the fact that in Japan the amount of  defense-related government 
expenditure is negligible. 
In the postwar era, two types of technology-related policies have been used 
to assist private firms: assistance for technology imports and assistance for 
R&D by domestic firms. Until the 1960s, the former policy played an impor- 
Table 9.1 
Government Funds 
R&D  Without  As % of 
as % of  Total  related  Private 
Expenditure  As % of  Defense-  Total 
Country  Year  GNPa  R&Da  R&D  R&D 
Japan  1983  2.29  22.2  2.9b 
1987  2.57  19.9  19.3  1.7 
United States  1987  2.65  48.2  26.8  35.1 
West Germany  1987  2.81  37.7  34.4  15.3 
United Kingdom  1986  2.29  38.5  17.2  25.0 
France  1986  2.29  43.7  28.9  22.8' 
~~  ~~  ~  ~ 
5ee  Indicators of  Science and Technology, 1989, Science and Technology Agency, Tokyo 
bSee Movemenrs of  Major Indicators of  Research and Development m  Japan,  1985, Agency of 
Industnal and Science Technology, Tokyo 
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tant  role for Japanese firms trying to catch up with  the international level; 
these firms had been left behind technologically due to the closure of the econ- 
omy during the war.  Today, technology import is still an important factor in 
some industries, such as the semiconductor industry and other high-tech in- 
dustries. However, in general, the policy emphasis has shifted to promoting 
domestic R&D. 
As  is indicated in table 9.1, the amount of  direct and indirect subsidies 
provided to promote domestic R&D in Japan is relatively small even among 
the most industrialized countries. This reflects in part MITI’s current stance 
of  not engaging in the “hard’ policy measures and also reflects the small role 
played  by  the  Japanese  defense  budget.  However,  government  support, 
though small, has been concentrated in the areas that would help commercial 
production. MITI has been consciously aiming “at promoting commercialy 
optimal technology,”  and  this  is in  sharp contrast to the American policy 
whose major contractor (the Defense Department) “tends to emphasize the 
design of new and better components and systems rather than process refine- 
ment” (Okimoto, Sugano, and Weinstein 1984, pp. 182-83).  To facilitate pri- 
vate efforts to improve production technology and cost-reduction know-how, 
MITI tried several devices to promote private R&D efforts by  furnishing co- 
ordination incentives. Perhaps the best publicized such device is the organi- 
zation of technology research associations (TRA). 
The TRA is an association of  several (from two to more than 50) private 
firms that is organized to conduct joint R&D effort with the help of govern- 
ment assistance, usually in the form of a subsidy. The idea of the TRA was 
imported from United Kingdom in 1961. Unlike the British research associa- 
tions, however, the Japanese TRA is organized as needed to solve specific 
technological challenges (rather than organized as one group within each in- 
dustry) and organized as a temporary organization, deemed to be dissolved 
after the designated period (rather than organized as a permanent entity) (see 
Wakasugi 1986). 
The Technology Research Association for Very Large Scale Integrated Cir- 
cuits (VLSI) is perhaps the best-known and most successful Japanese TRA.14 
This TRA was organized with five Japanese computer producers (Fujitsu, Hi- 
tachi, Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, and Toshiba) for the period of 1976-79  with 
the aim of developing high-density high-speed semiconductors. These would 
be used for new domestically produced computers being developed to chal- 
lenge the next-generation IBM mainframe computer (the future system). Dur- 
ing this period, MITI provided a subsidy of  Y29 billion (about $1 16 million 
at the concurrent  exchange rate).  With  the  fund provided  by  the  member 
firms, the total budget for this project amounted to about Y70  billion, which 
14. See Okimoto, Sugano, and Weinstein (1984) for the details of this project and a background 
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was  about the half  of  the total R&D expenditure of  the semiconductor in- 
dustry.  I5 
This TRA is considered to be  successful because it produced more than 
1,000 patent applications, some of  which are thought to be world-leading 
technology. Many members of the TRA thought that, with the results of this 
TRA,  the  Japanese  semiconductor industry caught  up  with  IBM  in  the 
integrated-circuit (IC) production technology. Indeed, executives of IBM vis- 
ited this TRA site several times during and after the operation (Sakakibara 
1981). Although the VLSI project is considered to have been successful, not 
all the TRAs produced similar results. For example, Wakasugi (1986) com- 
puted research funds spent for each patent application. While the private- 
sector average during  1973-82  as  Y  1.6 million,  six  chosen  TRAs  only 
scored Y4.7  to Y65.7 million. 
Moreover, the mechanism of the TRA is not very well understood. Unless 
member firms have complementary roles, such as parts supplier versus assem- 
bler, their interests normally conflict with each other. In the case of VLSI, for 
example, all members were competitors in the commercial computer market, 
and so their interests were at best mixed; obtaining better technology is a plus, 
but the rival’s acquisition of  the same technology is a minus. Moreover, as- 
suming that the results of  their efforts would belong to all member firms, 
providing no effort should have been the dominant strategy as long as the 
effort level of the firm could not be observed by other members. 
The case of VLSI is relatively unique in some respects, however. First, in 
the computer industry at the period, IBM was the clear leader, and the member 
companies could  not  have  survived had  they  not  made the  technological 
breakthroughs that the TRA aimed at. In this sense, their interests were simi- 
lar and cooperation incentives existed. Second, this project was a rare ex- 
ample in this period (and even today) in that it had its own research facility. 
Instead of  bringing back the problem to each company, member firms sent 
research workers to the facility where the research was done jointly. This cre- 
ated competition among research workers as their results were observable by 
the fellow researchers. Third, the amount of the subsidy was relatively large. 
In fact, according to Wakasugi (1986) again, the average ratio of government 
subsidy to total R&D expenditure for the semiconductor industry was about 
22% in  1976-79,  while it was only 2.9%  in the  1980-82  after the project 
ended. Fourth, the target of the project was not to develop a computer or an 
IC itself, the market in  which member firms were harshly competing with 
each other, but mainly to develop new  methods to produce better ICs. The 
interests of member firms, then, were not in deep conflict. 
Nonetheless, the example of VLSI also illustrates the problem of  R&D or 
industrial policy in Japan in general. First, as already explained, there is no 
clear logic as to why and how the TRA would work. A large amount of public 
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funds was poured into this industry, despite the fact that many experts were 
uncertain about the idea. Second, some may criticize it as a disguised strategic 
policy.16  Indeed, as we have seen, a relatively large amount was given to this 
industry, which is only a limited group of domestic firms. Although, MITI 
now  attempts to open TRA memberships to foreign firms, many chosen re- 
search topics are in high-tech areas, which seem to reflect the policymaker’s 
inclination to promote these types of industries. Moreover, outsiders could not 
have access to the results of the TRA for VLSI. Only after negotiations be- 
tween the U.S. and Japanese governments, were all patents, held either solely 
by the government or jointly by the government and the member firms, made 
public and freely accessible to outsiders. 
Third and most important, it is not clear why  and how  the five member 
firms were chosen. Clearly, becoming a member provides benefits either in 
terms of  public funding or the resulting technological advancement. Com- 
pared with both domestic and foreign outsiders, member firms enjoyed these 
benefits during the project period; they also held a more advantageous position 
created by the elevation of their technological level after the project. However, 
there were many domestic semiconductor producers who ended not participat- 
ing in the project. Even one major computer producer Oki Electric, who had 
a joint venture with an American maker, was excluded from the TRA.” In 
sum, the VLSI project seems to be another example of a government policy 
that favors industry’s insiders. 
9.5  ’Bade Negotiations 
Postwar trade between Japan and the United States has been riddled with 
numerous trade and economic disputes. Starting with the textile problem of 
1960s, the number of disputed items has been constantly increasing, and the 
nature of the problems has been changing and becoming more and more com- 
plicated. Roughly speaking, the disputed area has shifted from “excessive 
Japanese exports” such as export downpour to the United States to “barriers 
to American exports into Japan,” and from problems about “Japanese com- 
modity exports” to “other activities of Japanese firms,” such as dealings with 
intellectual properties, direct investments to the United States, and collusive 
behaviors of Japanese firms. In this section, we shall focus on those problems 
that are caused by Japanese commodity exports, especially in semiconductor 
industry. 
Past trade disputes between Japan and the United States may be classified 
into two distinct groups. The first group is made up of those disputes that were 
16. However, employing policy itself should not he denounced outright as I discussed in sec. 
9.2. 
17. Strictly speaking, however, the members are chosen on the grounds of voluntary applica- 
tion.  I could not prove whether or not there was any government intervention in the choice of 
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processed in a legitimate manner according to the American legal system. The 
second is those brought up and solved politically with bilateral negotiations. 
If  an American industry believes that Japanese exports have injured the 
industry because of  unanticipated developments, it can file a petition to the 
U.S.  International Trade Commission (USITC) to restrict Japanese imports 
(this is based on the safeguard clause). Similarly, if  it believes that Japanese 
products are being sold by unfair trade practices, such as dumping, it can file 
a petition to the Department of Commerce (DOC) and USITC (based on the 
antidumping and countervailing duty clause). The USITC (and/or DOC) will 
investigate the case and determine whether the industry is indeed injured and 
whether the injury is caused by unfair trade practices on the part of the Japa- 
nese. If the answer is yes, a discriminatory tariff may be imposed on the im- 
port from Japan.  If  the Japanese industry believes that the ruling does not 
reflect the true situation, it can in turn petition to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). According to the current rule, GATT encourages 
reconciliation, but, if  that fails, disputants can call together a panel of  third- 
party representatives whose ruling may become “binding” if  approved by the 
GATT council. 
A large number of disputes have been solved through this legitimate pro- 
cess. For example, between May 1986 and March 1989, the USITC gave final 
rulings on 23 items,  13 of which were ruled as caused by dumping and other 
Japanese unfair practices, 9 were found not guilty, and the ruling for the last 
item was mixed.’* One may note, however, that despite all these petitions filed 
by  American  firms and  all  these guilty rulings given by  the USITC  (and 
DOC), neither the Japanese firms nor the Japanese government ever formally 
protested these rulings by petitioning GATT. 
A significant number of  disputes, however, took a different course. Either 
before or after they file a petition alleging Japanese dumping, many American 
industries, such as those producing steel, automobiles, machinery, and semi- 
conductors, have applied political pressures to the U.S. administration as well 
as to Congress in order to obtain protection from Japanese imports. The typi- 
cal consequence is that the Japanese industries, with the support of the Japa- 
nese government, voluntarily restrain their exports to the U.S. market.I9  From 
the U.S. perspective, the reason for the choice of voluntary restraint is clear. 
Unlike imposing protective duties, which is explicitly prohibited by  GATT, 
asking the Japanese government to help create voluntary export cartels does 
not infringe on GATT clauses, though it is clearly contrary to the GATT phi- 
losophy. 
The semiconductor industry provides a major example of this type of case. 
Let me briefly outline the history of this dispute.20  The integrated circuit (IC) 
18. MITI, White Paper on International Trade, various issues. 
19. For an explicit account of these experiences, see, e.g., Destler and Sat0 (1982). 
20. For a more detailed account, see Okimoto, Sugano, and Weinstein (1984) and Pugel (1987). 287  Industrial Policy in Japan 
was invented and first marketed by U.S.  firms in the early 1960s. Helped by 
industrial policy, however, Japanese firms started to capture a significant share 
of the U.S. IC market in the late 1970s. The Japanese share in the U.S.  market 
increased rapidly in the early 1980s with little penetration into the Japanese 
market by U.S. competitors. This alarmed the U.S. firms, which started lob- 
bying  in the Congress. In February 1985, market-oriented,  sector-selective 
(MOSS) talks between the Japanese and U.S. governments started for all elec- 
tronics  industries, including  semiconductors.  In June of the same year,  the 
U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) filed a petition with the U.S. 
government  alleging that the Japanese semiconductor industry (according to 
the petition) denies U.S. firms access to the Japanese market and helps dump 
products in the U.S. market, thus violating Article 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974. This was followed by dumping petitions from individual American pro- 
ducers  on  64K  DRAMs  (dynamic access random  memory)  and  EPROMs 
(erasable-programmable  read-only  memory).  In  December  1985, the  U.S. 
government  itself filed a dumping suit against Japanese producers of 256K 
DRAMs, an unusual step in the history of trade disputes. 
In May 1986, the USITC issued a final ruling on 64K DRAMs, finding the 
Japanese producers guilty of dumping, anti-dumping duties started to be im- 
posed. Two months later, the Japanese government, fearing the application of 
Article 301 that would have triggered retaliatory tariffs on IC as well as non- 
IC products, made an agreement with U.S. government. With this agreement, 
the  Japanese  government  established  a cost-price  monitoring  system on IC 
products  so that  Japanese  firms will  not export  these products to the  U.S. 
market at prices  lower than their “fair market value” (FMV).  The Japanese 
government also agreed to (1) monitor export price in general so that Japanese 
exports to the U.S. through third countries will not injure American competi- 
tors and (2) take proper actions to facilitate sales of American IC products in 
the Japanese market. 
In April  1987, however, the U.S. government imposed a 100% retaliatory 
tariff on personal computers, electric machinery,  and color TVs on the basis 
of the Japanese government’s alleged violation of  the agreement on items  1 
and 2 above. On the other hand, the European Community (EC) filed a peti- 
tion to GATT that item 1 was in violation of the GATT agreement. In March 
1988, the GATT panel found item 1 in violation of GATT Article 11. 
How should we assess these consequences  of the IC trade conflict? There 
are two broad issues, one concerning the validity of the legal system and the 
other concerning U.  S.  demands and Japanese responses. 
Let me start with the problem about issues concerning the American legal 
process with the particular focus on the IC case. First, the legal process in the 
American  system states that protection  in the  form of  a protective tariff  is 
given if the practice under scrutiny is found to be injuring the American pro- 
ducer. Thus the American consumer’s interest is not reflected in the legal pro- 
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(VER) arrangements and other protective measures for the steel and automo- 
bile industries have seriously damaged the American consumers and users.z1 
In  figure 9.1, the movements of  the world IC dollar prices (in logarithmic 
terms) is shown before and after the trade disputes. The secular downward 
trends typical of this industry until 1984 were clearly disrupted after 1986. 
Second, the unfair trade practice that is most often cited in cases against 
Japanese products is “dumping.” The antidumping law in the United States 
defines dumping as pricing below fair market value. Oftentimes, the sum of 
“constructed value” and a certain profit  margin is used  as the fair market 
value. Constructed value (excluding the profit margin) is the sum of  direct 
production cost and indirect costs (which equals at least 10% of  the direct 
production cost). This definition may particularly harm Japanese producers, 
as they tend to be producers of diverse products. For example, NEC, one of 
the major IC producers in Japan, also produces personal computers (PCs), 
telecommunication  equipment, and other home electrical appliances. In short, 
many  Japanese producers may  be enjoying economies of  scope due to the 
existence of large overhead costs. The normal accounting procedure of calcu- 
lating the “fully distributed cost” may be quite artificial and cause unneces- 
sary burden on producers who enjoy economies of scope. 
Third,  IC  production  has  special technological  properties.  Its  yield  is 
known to improve as experience in production accumulates, and production 
cost diminishes as accumulated production increases. As is well known, the 
marginal cost of production with such a learning effect is the marginal cost of 
accumulated production when the learning effect ceases to exist.22  That is, 
even if  enough learning has not taken effect, and the current production cost 
is high, rational pricing behavior should take account of the long-run marginal 
cost that is the marginal production cost after sufficient learning will have 
occurred. Hence, the use of constructive value, which only reflects the current 
production cost and  does not  reflect the economically relevant production 
cost, is likely to impose a handicap on firms who expect to capture a large 
market share. 
Finally, a major reason that the Japanese government accepted the agree- 
ment was the threat of Article 301. Procedurally speaking, there is good rea- 
son to believe that the article itself is in violation of  GATT. Unlike escape 
clauses and antidumping laws, Article 301 does not have GATT approval, and 
its application is based only on the U.S. government’s unilateral judgrnenLz3 
21. For example, Tan (1987) estimated the costs of the steel agreement of  1985. According to 
his estimation, if terms of trade effect is not counted, costs to American consumers exceed $1 
billion annually, and costs to the entire economy between $0.8 billion and $1 billion annually. 
These costs may be reduced by up to $73 million if  the terms of  trade effect is accounted for. 
Crandall (1984) estimated that the automobile export restraint between  1981-83  cost American 
consumers $4.5 billion annually. See Feenstra (1984) for the effect of  quality and other general 
equilibrium effects in automobile case. 
22. For theoretical analysis, see, e.g., Spence (1981). 
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Fig. 9.1 
Source: Dataquest. 
Moreover, this article permits the U. S. government to impose retaliatory tar- 
iffs on products that are completely different from the product that allegedly is 
involved in unfair practices. It seems a dangerous tool in the international 
trade system in that it may trigger a retaliatory war. 
All of these points make one wonder why  the Japanese government ac- 
cepted the IC agreement of  1986 or the other VER agreements in  general. 
Indeed,  many  Japanese suggested their government bring the  case to  the 
GATT panel before the agreement was settled. The reason that the govern- 
ment did not take this action seems to be the familiar one; in spite of  their 
public stance to promote free trade, they do not make policy decisions on a 
philosophical basis because doing so might induce strong objections from dis- 
putants. As long as no strong opposition exists, they tend to ignore the stated 
Instead, the government tends to make decisions on a pragmatic ba- 
sis, which results in less confrontation among the disputants, especially when 
the resulting decision favors the domestic members of  the dispute. Accord- 
ingly, they chose the solution that benefited Japanese producers as well as 
U. S. producers by  forming the de facto government-supported producers’ 
cartel. 
This method of  solving trade disputes has been popular in  Japanese bu- 
reaucracy. It is practical and conforms to their experience. They can solve the 
disputes easily by  this method as long as the dispute is nonrepetitive. How- 
ever, this cartel solution creates rents to those industries (stockholders, man- 
agers, and workers) who eventually obtain cartel agreement. Thus, more and 
24. Another example is the MITI’s promotion of the Voluntary Export Restraint by Korean knit 
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more U.S. industries start lobbying to obtain protection, sometimes on  du- 
bious grounds. 
9.6  Japanese Policy-making 
According to the theory of rent seeking (and the theory of economic regu- 
lation), political decision making suffers from the political bias. Democratic 
decision making is heavily influenced by  political activities such as lobbying 
by  pressure groups, which takes up private resources. Only those who expect 
to obtain more benefit from the activities than the associated political cost will 
engage in these activities. But policy decisions tend to mean more, in  per 
capita terms, to the group of  people who are directly affected by  the policy 
(such as producers whose products are protected by a quota imposition), and 
mean less to the group whose benefits and losses are diluted by  the group’s 
large numbers (such as consumers in the case of trade protection). It follows 
that political decision making tends to favor those whose interests are directly 
connected to the policy decision itself (see, e.g., Downs 1957; Stigler 1971; 
Krueger 1974; Ordeshook 1986; and Peltzman 1989). 
In view of this theory, many trade conflicts between Japan and the United 
States were induced by U.S.  producers (and sometimes labor unions) who 
were seeking economic rents that would be realized by artificially raising the 
domestic price at the expense of  American consumers and users. Despite 
the fact that aggregate loss incurred by consumers (and users) may exceed the 
gain accrued to the producers, the loss is diluted by the large number of losers. 
Since political decisions in the United States are strongly influenced by lob- 
bying activity, these rent-seekers tend to influence heavily international nego- 
tiations, with results that are oftentimes against total U.S. interests. 
On the other hand, according to this theory there seem to be at least three 
reasons why the tendency to favor insiders’ interests exists in the decision- 
making policies of  the Japanese government. First, for more than 30 years, 
the Liberal Democratic party (LDP) has controlled the Japanese Diet without 
any disruption. Moreover, the Japanese Diet system follows British parlia- 
mentary democracy, in which party decisions bind the voting behavior of  all 
the party legislators, making the LDP decision practically the final Diet deci- 
sion. This contributed to the economic growth of  the country by  providing 
continuous and consistent economic policies. 
However, since there was no changeover of political power, it was practi- 
cally impossible to demolish vested interests from whoever had obtained po- 
litical rents. In other words, the current Japanese political system is an intri- 
cate  nexus  of  vested  interests,  shared  by  political  groups,  major  party 
politicians, and government bureaucrats. This system made the political cost 
of  changing existing policies extremely high. Except on rare occasions (such 
as the recent tax revision), only those pressures applied by strong foreign gov- 
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Second, Japanese bureaucracy is divided into many independent  ministries, 
and  the policy  research division of  the  LDP (the Policy Research Affairs 
Council, or PRAC) consists of committees parallel to each ministry so as to 
cover different industries, such as manufacturing, agriculture, finance, tele- 
communication, and so on. Each ministry is supposed to be responsible for 
overseeing “sound development” of the industry, so industry-specific interests 
tend to be reflected in the closed decision-making  process within the bureauc- 
racy and/or the major party. This renders industry-specific interests more po- 
litically effective and consumer interests less effective. 
Moreover, the final political decision is made, as I explained above, within 
the level of  the major party and its bureaucracy. Thus, if  there is a conflict 
among several industry-specific interests, it tends to be solved by closed ne- 
gotiations among ministries and legislators from various committees of  the 
PRAC. In a sense, through this negotiation process, producers of  different 
industries play a cooperative game in seeking a mutually efficient agreement. 
This seems to be in sharp contrast to the U.S.  system, where these conflicts 
tend to be solved in the Congress through open discussion. There, Congress- 
men  are not bound by  the party vote, thus voting decisions may  be  made 
independent of  party decisions. The U.S. system may be characterized as a 
noncooperative game in which each player pursues the outcome that is best 
suited for his or her industry. 
Compared with the noncooperative process, the negotiation-based solution 
tends to favor the status quo. If some player finds the proposed agreement to 
be worse than the status quo, he or she can simply deny the proposal; that is, 
negotiation allows veto power. There are further contrasts between negotia- 
tion and the noncooperative decision-making process. 
Following Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1989, let us call an action 
of a player (an endorsement of a policy by an industry, in our context) aggres- 
sive if the action (the policy) harms the other players (industries). It is straight- 
forward that  the negotiated outcome, which tends to be  mutually efficient 
among  the  players,  is  less  aggressive than  the  noncooperative outcome. 
Hence, if  industries play a political game to achieve their desired outcome, 
cooperative games tend to choose less aggressive outcomes, while noncoop- 
erative games tend to select more aggressive ones.25  This seems to be another 
reason why vested interests are apt to be preserved in Japanese policy deci- 
sions. 
However, this does not necessarily imply that the cooperative outcome is 
worse than  the noncooperative outcome. Clearly, the cooperative outcome 
is better than the noncooperative outcome for the negotiating parties. More- 
over, if the more aggressive behavior of the negotiating party harms third par- 
25. For example, Kiyono, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Ueda (1991)  showed that, if the extent of trade 
protection is politically determined in a small country with two import-competing industries pur- 
suing their industry-specific interests, the resulting protection level is higher in the noncooperative 
game than that which occurs when the possibility of  negotiation is added. 292  Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara 
ties, then the cooperative outcome Pareto dominates the noncooperative out- 
come. 
Third, the Japanese as a people prefer agreements through compromise to 
direct confrontations. Government is no exception. Whenever there is a con- 
flict, a solution is sought to satisfy all the disputants in  a backdoor closed 
negotiation. This tendency, with  the lack of  an open and public decision- 
making process, makes the process of policy decision-making, as well as the 
implication of the chosen policy, opaque and less transparent. Consequently, 
costs to organize the opposition are high. All of these factors contribute to the 
fact that Japanese consumers as a group have little voice in politics. 
9.7  The Case of the Large Stores Law 
Perhaps the tendency in Japanese policy-making is best illustrated by  the 
way the Law concerning the Adjustment of Retail Activities by Large-Scale 
Retail Stores (Large Stores Law) has been put into practice.26  The stated pur- 
pose of  this law is to control retail activities by  large stores in order to (1) 
secure the business opportunities of local retailers and (2) provide sound de- 
velopment of the retail trade industry, and at the same time (3) avoid hamper- 
ing consumers’ benefit. The  law  is applied to establishing and  extending 
buildings for retail business whose size exceeds 500 square meters. In prin- 
ciple, it allows large stores to start their business only with notifications to the 
MITI (in case the size of the enterprise exceeds 1,500 square meters, and to 
the prefectural governor otherwise) with the following restrictions. 
It requires MITI to review each notification. If MITI finds sufficient reason 
to believe that the activity of the large store may damage local small retailers, 
MITI is allowed, after consulting with the (governmental)  Large Stores Coun- 
cil, to advise the entrant to postpone opening and to reduce its business space. 
The Large Stores Council,  in  turn,  must consult the opinion of  the local 
Chamber of  Commerce, which sets up the Council to Accommodate Com- 
merce Activities (CRCA) in order to accommodate differences in local inter- 
ests. The CRCAs are supposed to consist of owners of local commercial busi- 
ness, consumers, and neutral members. 
The law explicitly restricts the review process as follows. Two notifications 
are required to be  filed. An  Article 3 notification must be  filed first by  the 
builder of the building, and large stores (or buildings, to be more precise) may 
not start their business until seven months following this notice. The Article 5 
notification requires that retailers who intend to do business in this building to 
declare, among other things, the starting date of  the business and the total 
shop space in  the building. The review is made and advice must be  given 
within four months from this notification. The discussion by the CRCA is also 
restricted to a three-week period. Hence, as long as notifications are filed 
26. Much of  what is written below depends upon Tsuruta (1988b). 293  Industrial Policy in Japan 
properly, any store should be able to start its business seven months after the 
Article 3 notification. 
However, a procedure that is completely different from the spirit of this law 
has been widely utilized. After the Article 3 notification is made to MITI, it 
has become a custom to obtain an advance opinion of  the local Chamber of 
Commerce (before the Article 5 notification is allowed) and, for that purpose, 
to hold what is called the “prior CRCA” to accommodate interests of  local 
retailers. This process, which is not written into the law, became authorized 
by  MITI as a part of the formal process. Because the prior CRCA is only an 
informal institution, however, there is no time limit for handing its conclusion 
to MITI, nor are the names of  its members disclosed. Consequently, many 
years are wasted until prior CRCA gives its opinion and until a large store can 
eventually open its building. For example, in one case it took five and a half 
years between the Article 3 and Article 5 notifications, which resulted in eight 
and a half years between the store’s announcement and its actual opening. In 
another case, more than 10 years elapsed between the announcement of  the 
store and the store’s actual opening.27 
MITI gave a directive (gyosei  shido) in  1979 that the actual opening must 
be made within 13 months from the Article 3 notification. After this directive, 
however, prior explanation by the large store to local people, which was sup- 
posed to be made before the Article 3 notification, became a forum to obtain 
the agreement of local stores; this is the “prior prior CRCA.” This again is an 
informal institution, and opponents can block any  conclusion indefinitely. 
There are also many  similar regulations laid down by  local governments, 
some of which regulate practically all establishment and expansion of  retail 
buildings. 
Because of these procedures, not only are large stores prevented from open- 
ing their new establishments, but also overt and covert forms of  pecuniary 
transfer  are prevalent. In  one case, in  order to obtain consent from local 
stores, one-third of the building space in a new establishment was allocated to 
local retailers at a rate one-third the rental cost of the other spaces. In other 
cases, bribes are allegedly paid to members of prior CRCA in order to secure 
prompt and more advantageous rulings. Because members of prior CRCA are 
nonpublic officials, these acts are not necessarily illegal. 
In spite of these procedures that impose large entry costs to new entrants, 
large domestic distributors did not voice their opposition to this system pub- 
licly until it became criticized openly by the U.S. government. Of course, part 
of the reason for such behavior is the political cost to the lobby that pursues 
the change. However, having such a system of entry cost may work to benefit 
those stores who intend to enter. For example, suppose this system creates an 
entry cost of  $3 million, which is not necessary if  the system is abolished. 
27. The former is the case of  JUSCO, which opened in Kamisato-cho in 1987, and the latter of 
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Suppose the market provides $5 million if  there is only one large store, $2 
million each if  there are two such stores, $1 million each if  there are three. 
The first large store that announces its intention to open can obtain $2 million 
after payment of the entry cost because there is no incentive for further entry. 
However, if  the system is eliminated, three stores will enter and each can 
receive only $1 million. 
The system of the Large Stores Law is a system for insiders, where not only 
local stores and large stores who have already entered, but also large stores 
whose entry is temporarily blockaded may benefit from the system. Consum- 
ers are the real losers, but there is no place where they can file their com- 
plaints. 
9.8  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have given accounts of Japanese industrial policy both from 
the historical perspective as well as from the political economy perspective. 
Japanese industrial policy has increasingly put more emphasis on soft policy 
measures, such as coordinating private incentives and disseminating informa- 
tion. Although no formal analysis has been seriously attempted, this kind of 
policy measure might be contributing to the Japanese export (or investment) 
downpour. For, by the very nature of these measures, private firms are forced 
to coordinate their timing in  increasing exports to a particular market and 
investment in a particular country. I believe serious theoretical as well as em- 
pirical analyses on these and other behaviors, which are typical in Japanese 
firms, needs to be carried out in the future. 
On the other hand, policy decisions in Japan are formed by negotiation of 
insiders and not made on clearly spelled-out rules. Outsiders who are harmed 
by  the decision have  little opportunity to get compensation, as hardly any 
formal grievance process exists in Japan. This system seems to aggravate for- 
eigners’ feelings that Japanese society is not “fair.” I believe, however, that it 
is not a question of fairness but the system of public decision making that is at 
the core of most conflicts between Japan and other countries. 
I  should also emphasize that foreign demands to Japan, especially U.S. 
demands, tend to reflect similar political biases. These demands often reflect 
industry-specific interests and may  work against consumers’ interests of  the 
objecting country. In international relations, it is most important to understand 
each other and  to rationally  solve conflicts without becoming excessively 
emotional. The issue of  Japanese industrial policies, and other issues cur- 
rently brought into question, should be solved quickly before political pres- 
sures and national emotions from both Japan and the United States destroy 
economic relations that are beneficial for both countries. 295  Industrial Policy in Japan 
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Comment  Laura D’  Andrea Tyson 
There are three major propositions about Japanese industrial policy offered in 
the paper by Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara: first, the objective of Japanese indus- 
trial policy has changed from what he calls a strategic objective of industrial 
restructuring or the targeting and promoting of key industries to something he 
calls a corrective objective of addressing market failures; second, the means 
of  Japanese industrial policy  have changed from so-called hard measures, 
such as preferential allocation of  foreign exchange and capital and other direct 
control and subsidy measures, to soft measures, such as structural adjustment 
assistance and R&D support; and third, to understand Japanese industrial pol- 
icy and the difficulties that outsiders have in breaking into the Japanese mar- 
ket, one must understand the “insider,” cooperative-game nature of Japanese 
policy-making. I agree with the second two propositions but I strongly dis- 
agree with the first. 
Okuno-Fujiwara characterizes strategic industrial policy as “industrial tar- 
geting”-choosing  certain industries for promotion because of  their special 
features, including their productivity growth, their growth potential, and their 
technological potential. In his opinion, this kind of industrial policy was char- 
acteristic of Japan through the early  1970s, but then gave way-in  part in 
response to private-sector resistance to government intervention and pnvate- 
sector support for the free market-to  so-called corrective industrial policy. 
In  contrast to  strategic industrial policy,  corrective industrial policy re- 
sponds to market failures, particularly failures that arise in the R&D process 
and failures in  moving resources out of  declining industries. According to 
Okuno-Fujiwara, the three main objectives of corrective industrial policy are 
to provide adjustment assistance to troubled industries, to encourage R&D in 
the private sector, and to address foreign criticisms of Japan’s foreign trade 
behavior. 
In my opinion, there has been no dramatic change in Japan’s industrial pol- 
icy objectives. Instead, I would argue, there has been continuity in two ways: 
continuity in the basic approach of targeting leading industries, activities, and 
even firms for promotion (although the forms of  promotion have changed), 
and continuity in the objective of  industrial policy-to  encourage competi- 
tiveness in targeted industries because of  the special economic benefits they 
are expected to generate for the entire economy. 
True, as Okuno-Fujiwara argues, there has been more emphasis on adjust- 
ment, especially in the  1970s when higher energy costs made industrial re- 
structuring critical. There has also been a change in  the tools of industrial 
policy toward more reliance on cooperative R&D funding. But industrial pol- 
icy objectives remain strategic. 
Laura D’Andrea Tyson is a professor of economics and director of the Institute of International 
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If the objectives were merely corrective, and if market forces were accorded 
the dominant role they are accorded in the United States, then corrective pol- 
icy in high technology would be as neutral across industries as possible. Imag- 
ine the United States with a corrective industrial policy. What would it look 
like? The government would not directly choose which technologies, indus- 
tries, or players benefited from these policies. The government’s selective or 
targeting role would be  limited to choices among technologies for defense 
purposes. There would be no targeting-no  picking of winners and losers- 
for commercial purposes. 
Now  look at the case in Japan. Japanese high-technology R&D support is 
targeted selectively, by activity, by industry, and often by firm. And the goal 
of  such support is commercial, not military. The idea driving Japan’s pro- 
grams is that government can and should play a role in picking high-tech win- 
ners and promoting them. 
A partial list of  current and recent R&D projects funded by  MITI, either 
directly or through its Agency for Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), 
gives a flavor of the “selective” Japanese approach to “corrective” R&D sup- 
port (see tables 9C.  1 and 9C. 2). 
All of these projects, like the VLSI project and earlier projects that went 
before them, have several distinctive features. First, all of the projects focus 
on a so-called precompetitive or generic technology problem, the solution of 
which will benefit a large number of companies. The fact that the problem is 
a common one and that the solution will have benefits that cannot be appro- 
priated by a single firm does not mean, however, that the project involved does 
not have an industry focus. The VLSI project was designed to solve technical 
problems for the semiconductor industry; the SIGMA project is designed to 
solve technical problems for the software industry. To  say that R&D support 
is “generic” is not the same thing as saying it is neutral. Generic R&D support 
of the Japanese variety most assuredly picks industrial winners. 
Second, the government provides direct funding as well as a variety of tax 
incentives to support its R&D projects. Third, the targeting of  a particular 
technology by the government acts as a signaling device to the business com- 
munity and encourages a bandwagon effect, as individual companies commit 
resources to compete with one another. And, fourth, the projects are cooper- 
atively funded by business and government. The government acts to facilitate 
cooperation among individual firms, both directly by bringing together a se- 
lected group of them to design and implement projects, and indirectly by pro- 
viding an antitrust environment conducive to such cooperation. Cooperation 
among individual companies encourages them to share technological infor- 
mation, to adopt common standards, and to create personal networks of scien- 
tists and engineers for future collaboration. 
All  of  these features of  Japanese industrial  policy  were  ingredients of 
MITI’s  optoelectronics project,  which  began  in  1979  and  was  extended 
through 1987. Fourteen companies, chosen by  MITI, worked together to de- 299  Industrial Policy in Japan 
Table 9C.1  Ongoing AIST National Technology Projects 
Project  Purpose 
Manganese nodule mining system, 1981- 
91, 20 billion yen 
High-speed computer,  198  1-89,  23 billion 
Yen 
Automated sewing system, 1982-90,  10 
Advanced robot technology  1983-90,  20 
Observation system for the ERS-I, 1984- 
billion yen 
billion yen 
90, 23 billion yen 
Water treatment system, 1985-90,  11.8 
interoperable data base, 1985-91,  15 
billion yen 
billion yen 
Advanced material processing, 1986-93,  15 
billion yen 
Advanced high-power chemical products, 
1988-96,  15 billion yen 
To develop a hydraulic mining system for 
harvesting large quantities of manganese 
nodules from the deep-ocean floor 
To  develop high-speed computer systems 
for scientific applications 
To develop an automated continuous sewing 
system for the textile industry 
To develop advanced robot technology to 
replace humans in dangerous work 
To  develop, with the STA, an observation 
system for the earth resources satellite 
ERS- 1 
To develop a bioreactor to process and 
purify waste water 
To enable data bases with different 
operating systems to exchange 
information 
To  develop advanced material processing 
equipment, such as high-power excimer 
lasers and high-performance machine 
tools 
To produce advanced chemical products 
such as dyes and insulating materials 
using marine-life resources 
Source; AIST (total budget figures have been estimated), as cited in Steven K. Vogel, “Japanese 
High Technology, Politics, and Power,” BRIE Research Paper no. 2, Berkeley Roundtable on the 
International Economy, University of California, Berkeley, March 1989. 
velop optical measurement and control systems. About one-third of the total 
funding for the project was provided directly by MITI, with company funds 
making up the remainder. MITI orchestrated the organization of  the project 
into smaller groups to work on complementary questions for specific opto- 
electronics devices. A special cooperative R&D laboratory was established by 
MITI and the business participants for the project. 
The optoelectronics project is widely regarded both inside and outside of 
Japan as a success. Largely as a result of this project, within six years Japa- 
nese companies went from positions of inferiority to virtual domination in the 
optoelectronics area. Their success in this area bolstered their competitiveness 
in a wide range of commercial products, including video discs, optical fibers, 
laser beam printers, medical lasers, and fax machines. The same Japanese 
companies who cooperated in the joint R&D project on optoelectronics now 300  Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara 
Table 9C.2  Other Major MITI Projects 
Project  Purpose 
Sunshine project 1974- 
Moonlight project 1978- 
To develop coal liquefaction and gasification, solar 
power generation, and geothermal and hydrogen 
energy 
To develop energy conservation technology such as 
magnetohydrodynamic  (MHD) power 
generators, high-efficiency gas turbines, 
chemical heat pumps 
Basic technologies for future  To stimulate R&D for next-generation technology 
and to promote cooperation between companies, 
universities, and the government in research on 
new materials, biotechnology, and new devices 
artificial intelligence to make them easier to run 
industries 198 1- 
Fifth generation computer 1982- 
SIGMA (software industrialized 
To develop advanced computers that will use 
To develop an automated system for producing 
generator and maintenance aids)  software 
1985-89 
~~~~~ 
Source: AIST, as cited in Steven K. Vogel, “Japanese High Technology, Politics, and Power,” 
BRIE Research Paper no. 2, Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, University of 
California, Berkeley, March 1989. 
compete with one another for global leadership in these and other products 
embodying optoelectronic technology. 
Not all cooperative R&D projects are as successful as the VLSI project or 
the optoelectronics project. There have been well-known difficulties in  the 
Mth-generation computer project to develop artificial intelligence and in the 
SIGMA project to develop automated systems to produce software. But it 
would be premature to write off  these projects as failures. Some of the ma- 
chines developed under the fifth-generation project are now being successfully 
tested in Japan and abroad. And the VLSI project, which was terminated in 
response to U.S.  pressure, was technically a failure since it did not perfect x- 
ray lithography. But the project is widely credited as a critical factor behind 
the success of Japanese companies in DRAMS. As these examples indicate, 
one needs to be careful about the definition of success and the time frame used 
in judging the success of cooperative R&D projects in Japan. 
What are the consequences of Japan’s continued commitment to a strategic 
industrial policy in several high-technology industries for its pattern of foreign 
trade? First, Japan’s successful infant-industry promotion has been an impor- 
tant factor in its export successes in a variety of technology-intensive indus- 
tries, particularly those in the electronics sector. Second, Japan’s targeting has 
had  a significant effect on the competitive strategies of  both domestic and 
foreign companies. The Japanese companies favored by  targeting have been 
encouraged to invest aggressively to dominate the Japanese market, while for- 301  Industrial Policy in Japan 
eign competitors have been discouraged from undertaking the investment nec- 
essary to break into that market. 
Third, the R&D programs that have become the backbone of industrial tar- 
geting have been yet another factor in the Japanese environment that encour- 
ages cooperation among Japanese firms to the  disadvantage of  outsiders. 
These programs have reinforced the patterns of  specialization, distribution, 
cooperation, and trust that were fostered by the long period of formal protec- 
tion and that are still encouraged by the keiretsu system. As a result of these 
patterns, Japanese companies continue to prefer to buy  from one another 
rather than from an outsider, even when that outsider is a new Japanese entrant 
and especially when that outsider is a foreign company. 
There is no doubt that overt trade and investment barriers to the Japanese 
market have been largely eliminated. But government R&D subsidies con- 
tinue to target activities and industries for promotion, and these subsidies con- 
tinue to advantage Japanese producers in both domestic and global competi- 
tion. In addition, structural barriers continue to persist in a variety of forms, 
including standards, testing, and certification procedures, procurement and 
bidding practices, and the pattern of cooperative business relationships that 
Japan’s strategic industrial policy continues to foster. To many foreign produc- 
ers, especially those competing with Japanese companies in  activities that 
have  been accorded strategic significance by  the Japanese government, the 
Japanese market, while formally open, is effectively closed. ’ 
Comment  Edward M. Graham 
Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara gives us a succinct, balanced, and useful analysis 
of  Japan’s post-World  War  I1 industrial policy. Even so, this analysis is un- 
likely to please many Americans who have made a career of commenting upon 
Japan. 
For example, there are those Americans who see Japan’s success in inter- 
national trade as the result of MITI “targeting” of specific industries and grant- 
ing of subsidies to favored firms in these industries. These firms, it is claimed, 
then “dump” their output in international markets (e.g., the United States), 
sowing havoc among non-Japanese competitors (e.g., U.S. rival firms). In the 
extreme, it is alleged that U.S. rivals of the chosen Japanese firms are delib- 
erately slated for annihilation by  Japan’s warlike governmenthndustrial alli- 
1. For more detail on the continued closure of the Japanese market see Laura D’Andrea Tyson 
and John Zysman, “Developmental Strategy and Production Innovation in Japan” in Politics and 
Producrivity: The Real Story ofwhy  Japan Works,  ed. Chalmers Johnson, Laura D’ Andrea Tyson, 
and John Zysman (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Press, 1989). 
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ance. My depiction here may sound like a caricature, but having changed my 
residence to Washington, D.C., barely six months ago [  19891, I hear depic- 
tions such as these frequently articulated, most recently by  a person quite 
senior in the Executive Office of the President of the United States. 
Okuno-Fujiwara’s analysis suggests that the model implicit in this depiction 
better describes Japan before the first oil crisis than Japan of today. But even 
in  the heyday of MITI activism, the model is somewhat simplistic; today, it 
just is not descriptive of what really goes on in Japan. Indeed, one of the major 
contributions Okuno-Fujiwara makes is to remind us that Japan’s industrial 
policy has been anything but invariant during the past 40 or so years. Rather, 
it has evolved and undergone quite significant changes, so that generalizations 
about this policy that might have been valid in 1965 can be completely off the 
mark in 1991. 
But, at the other extreme, there are Americans who assert that Japan’s eco- 
nomic success is simply the result of good macroeconomic management com- 
bined with high rates of  domestic savings and capital formation. Apart from 
differences that are readily explained via the Economics 101 textbook, they 
claim,  Japan  is really  no  different from any other advanced market-based 
economy. 
Okuno-Fujiwara, although clearly more sympathetic to this view  than to 
the former, disabuses the more extreme proponents of the “Japan is no differ- 
ent” school. Japan’s political system is, he admits, stacked very heavily in 
favor of the interests of the established, large producers. To be sure, the same 
could probably be said of  all of the large industrial democracies (and even 
more so of certain of the rapidly industrializing nations, e.g., Korea). But the 
degree to which producers’ interests are favored by government policies over 
consumer interests is significantly greater in Japan than in the United States, 
Canada, or the nations of Western Europe. 
Many readers doubtlessly will be disappointed by Okuno-Fujiwara’s failure 
to attempt to assess the extent to which Japan’s success as an economic power 
has been the result of  deliberate industrial policy versus the extent to which 
other explanations are more powerful. My own feeling here is that the author 
is prudent in his unwillingness to take on this assessment. Japan’s success is 
doubtlessly due to many interrelated factors, for example, high saving and 
investment rates (but why are these so much higher in Japan than in  north 
America or Western Europe?), priority given to building an excellent educa- 
tion system (with the result that Japan easily has the most literate and numer- 
ate work force of all the advanced nations), cultural factors (leading to ex- 
traordinary  ability  of  organizations  to  innovate and  to  adapt to  changing 
circumstances?), effective macromanagement of the economy, low priority ac- 
corded to the military (but isn’t Japan a “free rider” on the United States with 
respect to national defense?), intense rivalry among the major keiretsu groups, 
lifelong employment practices of  major firms (enabling managers to take a 
“long-run’’ perspective on their functions?), and, yes, an industrial policy that 303  Industrial Policy in Japan 
without question is more activist than anything in the United States (although 
perhaps today not as activist as that of France). 
Which of these factors explain Japan’s success? I suspect that they all do to 
some degree, and I do not claim that my little list is exhaustive by any means. 
I  further suspect that any effort to assign weights to any of  these factors is 
doomed to failure. Any model to calculate such weights will likely be highly 
overspecified, and the explanatory variables highly collinear. 
Alas, the implication of my remarks is that the debate between those who 
see Japan as “different”  and those who see Japan as “no different” will never 
be resolved.  This is unfortunate  if  for no other reason than that some of us 
would like to see extremists at either end of this debate silenced once and for 
all. But, given the unlikelihood  that this will ever happen,  the best we can 
hope  for is  analysis  of  the sort Okuno-Fujiwara  gives us.  This analysis  is 
descriptive and historical, and he is wise not to attempt to use his considerable 
talents as a mathematician  or econometrician  in this domain. He cannot re- 
solve our debate, but he can help ensure that our models of how Japan works, 
implicit and explicit, are consistent with the complex reality of that nation’s 
economy. This Page Intentionally Left Blank